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Trade Wars 
 
Current United States trade policies are in line 
with an old economic doctrine known as mer-
cantilism which calls for protectionist policies to 
reduce imports and expand exports with the goal 
of generating large trade surpluses. This doctrine 
has been discredited for over 200 years following 
the analyses of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and 
other late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century economists. Mercantilist policies by one 
country not only lower well-being in that country 
through harm to consumers and industries rely-
ing on imported inputs but also almost always 
lead to trade wars with that country’s trading 
partners. This is precisely what appears to be hap-
pening today. Canada, Mexico, China, the Euro-
pean Union (EU), and other targets of recent 
United States tariffs have all declared their inten-
tions to retaliate with tariffs of their own and 
most have also filed complaints about the United 
States policies with the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO).  
Historically, trade wars have not been uncom-
mon. In fact, the current world trade system es-
tablished after World War II is aimed at prevent-
ing or reducing the likelihood that countries 
would enter into such tit-for-tat tariff competi-
tions. In the aftermath of the 1929 stock market 
crash, the United States government raised al-
ready high tariff levels even higher with the 
Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 in a misguided effort 
to counter the effects of the economic crisis 
(Krugman et al., 2012). Other countries raised 
their tariffs in response and this trade war con- 
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  7-13-18 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  120.00  *  * 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  182.33  168.80  186.85 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  165.82  *  163.51 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  212.93  223.52  206.48 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  86.31  82.22  72.72 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  104.10  81.73  82.47 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  185.51  156.95  167.49 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  429.14  379.36  384.71 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4.04  4.43  4.35 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.38  3.39  3.27 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  9.07  8.35  7.60 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.71  5.20  4.96 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.19  2.81  2.79 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  148.00  170.00  * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75.00  100.00  107.50 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  *  102.50  107.50 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  102.50  130.00  1000.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42.00  39.00  36.95 
 ⃰ No Market          
tributed significantly to prolonging the Great Depres-
sion and deepening its severity. Between 1929 and 
1933, world exports fell by about 56 percent while 
United States exports and imports both fell by 66 per-
cent (United Nations, 2018; Carter et al., 2006). The 
value of United States exports did not return to the 
level reached in 1929 until the end of World War II. 
The declines in United States and global trade were 
due in part to the economic contraction occurring at 
that time, but widespread protectionist policies exac-
erbated the effects of the crisis. Trade wars are always 
negative-sum games in which the value of the losses 
far outweighs the value of actual gains, if any.  
After World War II, world leaders, cognizant of this 
history, met to design a better global system for inter-
national economic relations. In 1944, at Bretton-
Woods, Vermont, they agreed to establish the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund to oversee international finan-
cial transactions and the World Bank to help with post
-war reconstruction. In 1947, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established to pro-
vide mechanisms for agreeing on global trade rules 
and for resolving trade disputes. The GATT was fold-
ed into the newly-created WTO in 1995 along with 
other agreements on services, agricultural trade, and 
technical standards. Both the GATT and WTO have 
held periodic rounds of negotiations during which 
countries agree to rules on international trade and 
make commitments concerning how they will comply 
with these rules. The Uruguay Round (1986-1994) was 
the eighth round and the last to be successfully com-
pleted (the current Doha Development Round 
launched in 2001 appears to be stalled). The early 
rounds led to significant reductions in industrial tariffs 
in high-income countries from around 20-30 percent 
to averages today of only 2-3 percent (WTO, 2017; 
World Bank, 2018). As an example of the types of 
rules negotiated for these agreements, the 1995 Agri-
culture Agreement included a provision that countries 
would eliminate non-tariff barriers (e.g., quotas) to 
agricultural trade translating their levels of protection 
into equivalent tariffs that were to be reduced by 36 
percent over six years.   
 In addition to organizing rounds of multilat-
eral trade negotiations, the WTO oversees procedures 
for settling disputes. If a country believes that another 
country has violated its obligations, it can request con-
sultations and if the dispute is still not settled, petition 
the WTO to establish a dispute- settlement panel to  
rule on the merits of the complaint. If the judg-
ment of the panel is that a country has violated its 
commitments, it is expected to change its policies 
or offer compensatory payments to the complain-
ant. In 2002, Brazil filed a complaint against Unit-
ed States cotton subsidies and the dispute-
settlement panel ruled in its favor. Rather than 
change its policy, the United States government 
agreed to pay Brazil compensation for a certain 
number of years. Another dispute was resolved in 
favor of the United States and Canada which had 
challenged the EU’s ban on imported beef raised 
with hormones. The EU refused to change its poli-
cy and no compensation could be negotiated so 
the WTO allowed the United States and Canada to 
levy retaliatory tariffs without penalty. The hor-
mone dispute was eventually closed with agree-
ment by the EU to purchase certain quantities of 
North American beef that is hormone-free (e.g., 
organic) while maintaining its ban on beef raised 
with hormone treatments (Peterson, 2016).  
The WTO dispute settlement procedures can be 
slow and occasionally ineffective as in the US/
Canada-EU hormone case but they do provide a 
way for countries to resolve disputes without get-
ting into full-blown trade wars. There have been 
about 500 disputes that have been submitted to the 
WTO since 1995, most of which have been re-
solved without invoking the formal procedures 
and only a handful of which have wound up with 
trade retaliation as in the hormone case. Farley 
(2017) reports that the United States has won 91 
percent of the complaints it has filed and lost 89 
percent of the cases brought against it. The won-
lost statistics for other countries are essentially 
identical to those for the United States. Those who 
claim that dispute settlement at the WTO is unfair 
to the United States are simply mistaken (Farley, 
2017). 
The nominal value of total world trade in 1948 was 
about $60 billion compared with values on the or-
der $15,500 billion in 2016 (WTO, 2017). In 1950, 
about 5.5 percent of world output was exported 
compared with 28.5 percent in 2016 (United Na-
tions, 2018; World Bank, 2018). Inflation, lower 
transportation costs, and economic growth explain 
much of this dramatic change but reduced tariff 
levels have also contributed significantly to the 
growth of trade and global output. Protectionism,  
on the other hand, slows growth and can give rise to 
serious detrimental effects in particular industries. This 
is particularly true of United States and Nebraska agri-
culture both of which are highly dependent on the rev-
enue from exports for economic well-being. In 2017, 
Chinese imports of United States soybeans accounted 
for 57 percent of the total value of United States soy-
bean exports. In the first half of 2018, Chinese soybean 
imports from the United States were 26 percent below 
the level reached during the same period in 2017 be-
cause of the anticipated trade war (FAS, 2018). Good 
(2018) points to falling commodity prices and high-
lights the particular difficulties for soybean and pork 
producers as a result of the trade wars. Brazilian soy-
bean exports to China already surpass those of the 
United States and are likely to increase further as Chi-
nese imports shift away from the United States.  
The history of WTO dispute settlement suggests that 
the United States will lose the cases being brought 
against it in the aftermath of the various tariff increas-
es. The national-security justification for United States 
tariffs on steel and aluminum is unlikely to prevail and 
the unilateral tariff increases for goods from China on 
the grounds of past Chinese currency manipulations 
are also unlikely to pass muster. To the extent that the 
United States has legitimate complaints against the 
policies of China and other countries, it would be bet-
ter to rely on the WTO dispute-settlement mecha-
nisms instead of deploying unilateral tariff increases. 
The United States is more likely to attain its objectives 
on international trade by following normal WTO pro-
cedures than by declaring trade wars. In addition, uni-
lateral protectionist policies lead to retaliation and un-
dermine the effectiveness of the global trading system 
that has been painstakingly developed over the past 70 
years and that has contributed importantly to United 
States and global economic growth and improved in-
ternational relations.   
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